The recognition of self-face is a unique and complex phenomenon in many aspects, including its associated perceptual integration process, its emergence during development, and its socio-motivational effect. This may explain the failure of classical attempts to identify the cortical areas specifically responsive to self-face and designate them as a unique system related to 'self'. Neuroimaging findings regarding selfface recognition seem to be explained comprehensively by a recent forward-model account of the three categories of self: the physical, interpersonal, and social selves. Self-face-specific activation in the sensory and motor association cortices may reflect cognitive scrutiny due to prediction error or task-induced topdown attention in the physical internal schema related to the self-face. Self-face-specific deactivation in some amodal association cortices in the dorsomedial frontal and lateral posterior cortices may reflect adaptive suppression of the default recruitment of the social-response system during face recognition. Self-face-specific activation under a social context in the ventral aspect of the medial prefrontal cortex and the posterior cingulate cortex may reflect cognitive scrutiny of the internal schema related to the social value of the self. The multi-facet nature of self-face-specific activation may hold potential as the basis for a multi-dimensional diagnostic tool for the cognitive system.
Introduction
One's self-face is important, unique, and special in many different senses and contexts. The neural process underlying self-face recognition has interested researchers in different fields for various reasons. The diversity among researchers has resulted in variations in opinions and approaches concerning neuroimaging studies on self-face recognition and in inconsistency in the interpretation of results.
In this review, I have attempted to demonstrate that the cognitive or neural processes of self-face recognition can be understood comprehensively by considering three different aspects of self-face recognition. Specifically, the processes are dissociated into three domains, according to the conceptual framework of the three-layer developmental model of self-related cognition (Sugiura, 2013) . In this work, I provide an overview of the different fields of psychological and clinical research with interest in examining the process of self-face recognition. I then review the neuroimaging findings on self-face recognition with regard to how the three-layer framework addresses the multi-faceted and self-non-specific nature of this complex concept. This finally leads to the idea that variation in the activation of different brain regions during self-face recognition may reflect the different aspects of the cognitive system. I propose that activation during self-face recognition may be used as a multi-dimensional diagnostic tool for cognition.
Psychological and clinical background

"This is not me"
Neuropsychologists or psychiatrists may have particular interest in the process of self-face recognition in the mirror, especially in relation to the underlying perceptual integration process, which focuses on the interplay between bottom-up perceptual and topdown supervisory processes. This interest is precipitated primarily by the observation that some patients with dementia misidentify their self-image in the mirror ('mirror sign'). These patients typically insist that their self-image in the mirror is not them but, instead, their friend, even though they usually retain face recognition and mirror use (e.g., combing) abilities.
An influential account of this phenomenon suggests that there are two routes in the bottom-up perceptual process and that these are both controlled by a top-down supervisory process (Breen et al., 2001; Coltheart, 2010) . One perceptual route is a common facerecognition process in which the visual features of the face in the mirror are matched with a figurative representation of the face in the visual long-term memory. Another route involves detecting temporal contingency between one's bodily movements and the visually perceived motion of the image in the mirror. It has been assumed that each route may produce false belief of "not me" because of occasional disturbance (i.e., the appearance and motion of the face may differ from the figurative representation and the predicted movement, respectively), but that these perceptions are immediately corrected by the top-down supervisory process, which integrates the information from both routes and contexts. The mirror sign is considered to require coincidental perturbation of one perceptual route and supervisory process, with the result that the false belief generated by the damaged perceptual route is not corrected (Breen et al., 2001; Coltheart, 2010) .
The development of self-recognition by human infants and other animals
Animal and developmental psychologists are interested in when and how visual self-recognition emerges during development. This ability appears to rely on a process that overrides the common facerecognition process.
In animals, self-recognition ability is seen only in a small number of highly 'intelligent' species. In human infants, it becomes evident at a relatively advanced developmental stage. Therefore, this ability is considered a hallmark of a higher level of social-cognitive development that only humans and a few other animal species can achieve (Gallup, 1982; Suddendorf and Collier-Baker, 2009) .
It seems that the emergence of self-recognition ability involves the inhibition of common social responses toward conspecifics. When tested for this ability, animals generally respond to the selfimage in the mirror as if they were being confronted by another animal. Only a few of the examined species stopped displaying this social behavior and started to show behavior indicative of an understanding of the self-image in the mirror (Gallup, 1982; Suddendorf and Collier-Baker, 2009) . A special technique called the "mark test" has been introduced for objective measurements of self-recognition by these animals (Gallup, 1970) . In this test, a mark is placed on a conspicuous part of the body that is not directly observable by the animal (often near the face) without the animal knowing, and then the animal is placed in front of a mirror. When animals cease mirror-directed behavior and initiate mark-directed behavior, such as touching the mark directly, they are considered capable of recognizing themselves in the mirror.
Two lines of relevant findings have encouraged researchers to consider this ability an indication of a special level of socialcognitive development that allows for conceptualization of 'self' and 'other'. First, animals that show evidence of visual selfrecognition also show the ability to infer the mental state, such as belief and feeling, of another. Second, these animals have large brains relative to their body weight (Gallup, 1982; Plotnik et al., 2006; Prior et al., 2008; Reiss and Marino, 2001) . It is, therefore, attractive to assume that a special neural system has evolved in the developed brain to represent the concepts of 'self' and 'other', and that this is required for both visual self-recognition and inference of the mental state of others. In human infants, self-recognition in the mirror emerges during the second year of their life, coincident with the inhibition of common social responses toward other babies (Amsterdam, 1972) . This emergence also coincides with that of empathic behavior (Bischof-Köhler, 1988; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992) .
Social aspects of the self-face
Social psychologists are interested in how the perceived appearance of one's own face from the perspective of others affects self-awareness, self-evaluation, and social behavior. This interest is also shared by some clinical professionals, such as orthodontics and facial plastic/reconstructive surgeons, as well as psychotherapists or psychiatrists working with patients with self-image disorders. This field of research is related to the cognitive processes associated with processing social values.
One is more or less aware that the self is a social object that has an effect on others. Public self-consciousness is a commonly used measure of the extent of this awareness (Fenigstein et al., 1975) . The face, with respect to its perceived attractiveness and expressive ability, has a particularly strong impact on these social effects.
A person's facial attractiveness affects how they are evaluated and treated by observers. Evolutionary theories posit that facial attractiveness is an honest indicator of fitness, health, quality, and reproductive value. People with attractive faces tend to receive higher evaluations about their abilities (Clifford and Walster, 1973; Landy and Sigall, 1974) and have higher incomes, owing to privileged hiring or promotions (Frieze et al., 1991; Marlowe et al., 1996) . The divergent evaluation and treatment of attractive and unattractive targets correlate with differential behaviors and traits. Fig. 1 . Self-face-specific activation. The locations of the peak voxels are plotted in the y-z plane of the MNI coordinate system on the lateral surface of the left (left panel) and right (right panel) hemispheres. The eleven contrasts from nine studies are indicated using different symbols. Contrasts were limited to those comparing the event-related response to the self-face with that to the face of a familiar person (e.g., a friend, colleague), or a regression analysis of the response according to the degree of 'selfness' in the morphed face of the self and the familiar person. All the included studies used an uncorrected p < 0.001 or a more stringent threshold in voxel-level analysis and reported the results in the MNI coordinate system. The peaks 20 mm or more in distance leftward (x ≤ −20) and rightward (x ≥ 20) from the midsagittal plane are plotted on the left and right hemispheres, respectively. One peak less than 20 mm in distance (Platek et al., 2006) was not included. The anatomical image represents a standard single-subject anatomical image from SPM8. Two contrasts were included when two contexts existed: one study (Oikawa et al., 2012 ) manipulated the impression of the self-face to make it more attractive [a] or unattractive [b] , and the other Compared with unattractive adults, attractive adults are more extroverted and possess more traditional attitudes, higher selfesteem, and better social skills (Langlois et al., 2000) . Improving facial appearance via surgical treatment of maxillofacial deformities or esthetic disorders has been shown to affect the self-esteem and mood of patients (Alves et al., 2005; Motegi et al., 2003) . Patients who have behavioral problems or psychotic symptoms were exposed to pictures of their faces with the purpose of improving their self-image, and some therapeutic effects have been reported (Fryrear, 1983) .
Facial movement is an important component of expressive behavior. The Self-Monitoring Inventory is an index of the awareness of and the self-evaluation skills related to expressive behavior. Those who self-evaluate highly may be especially responsive to social and interpersonal cues of situationally appropriate behavior. Conversely, low self-evaluation is thought to reflect inner attitudes, emotions, and dispositions (Gangestad and Snyder, 2000) . In fact, high self-evaluators are good at leaving favorable impressions on others and are accurate in predicting these impressions (Tobey and Tunnell, 1981) .
Neuroimaging findings concerning self-face recognition
3.1. In search of 'self' Functional brain mapping studies of self-face recognition have been primarily driven by the motivation to identify a unique neural system responsible for the conceptualization of 'self', which is a characteristic of only a limited number of animal species with human-like intelligence. This concept may have arisen partially from findings concerning mirrored-self recognition in animal and developmental psychology.
Pioneered by three works published in 2000 (Keenan et al., 2000; Kircher et al., 2000; Sugiura et al., 2000) , more than a dozen studies (Apps et al., 2012 (Apps et al., , 2013 Devue et al., 2007; Kaplan et al., 2008; Morita et al., 2008; Oikawa et al., 2012; Platek et al., 2004 Platek et al., , 2006 Sugiura et al., 2005 Sugiura et al., , 2006 Sugiura et al., , 2008 Sugiura et al., , 2012 Sugiura et al., , 2014 Taylor et al., 2009; Uddin et al., 2005) have so far reported a unique pattern of brain activation during self-face recognition that contrasts with the pattern observed during the perception of other people's faces (both familiar and unfamiliar). In early studies, which typically employed a small number of subjects and a liberal statistical threshold, the reported identity of the activated regions varied considerably across studies (see Devue and Bredart, 2011; Platek et al., 2008; van Veluw and Chance, 2014 for review) . In recent studies, however, the activated regions appear to mostly localize within a specific area in the lateral cortex of the right hemisphere ( Fig. 1) .
These results are disappointing with respect to the quest for a unique system responsible for the concept of self. First, the identified activation clusters are largely in sensory or motor association cortices, which are unlikely to be responsible for a 'special' level of social-cognitive development. One reasonably would have expected multimodal association cortices, the evolutionary development of which is evident in only a few 'intelligent' animal species. Second, more critically, these results are largely inconsistent with the findings for other types of self-cognition. For example, activation during the perception of the self-directed eye-gaze of others has been reported primarily in the bilateral temporal and medial prefrontal cortices (Senju and Johnson, 2009) . Similarly, during selfreflection (e.g., trait judgment), activation is reported in the medial frontal, parietal, and cingulate cortices (Craik et al., 1999; Kelley et al., 2002) .
Furthermore, recent studies have presented self-face-specific findings that do not conform conceptually to the unique-system notion. First, self-specific deactivation, rather than activation, has been postulated for the characteristics of activity changes during self-face recognition. Several neuroimaging studies have reported deactivation during the recognition of the self-face, relative to that of other (familiar and unfamiliar) faces, in the bilateral temporoparietal junction (Fig. 2) , anterior temporal cortex, and medial prefrontal cortex (Devue et al., 2007; Morita et al., 2008; Sugiura et al., 2005 Sugiura et al., , 2008 Sugiura et al., , 2012 Uddin et al., 2005) . In the unique system theory, it is not explained why deactivation of a specific neural system is necessary for self-concept. Second, context-specific self-face-specific activation has been reported (Fig. 3) . One study identified such activation in the ventromedial prefrontal and posterior cingulate cortices when the face presentation series included a large proportion of unfamiliar faces as distractors . Another study, using young female subjects (Oikawa et al., 2012) , manipulated the perceived attractiveness of the presented 'self' and 'other' faces to exploit the contrast effect (Cash et al., 1983) ; the self-face looked relatively attractive among the series of unattractive distractor faces. Self-face-specific activation in the posterior cingulate cortex and ventral tegmental area, components of the reward system, is enhanced by manipulation to make more attractive, but not by manipulation to make less attractive. This observed context-dependent activation, which is separate from the common self-face-specific activation, is also unlikely to be explained fully by a simple notion of a unique system.
The three-layer framework of self-cognition
Abandoning the notion of a unique system for the concept of self, recent neuroscientific accounts of self-cognition assume multiple categories of self, each of which is supported by a distinct cortical network involved in self-nonspecific processes (Farmer and Tsakiris, 2012; Gillihan and Farah, 2005; Northoff et al., 2006; Uddin et al., 2007) . A recent comprehensive model proposed three categories; namely, the physical self, interpersonal self, and social self (Sugiura, 2011 (Sugiura, , 2013 .
In this model, the processes of self-face recognition that are addressed classically are categorized primarily into the concept of the physical self. The physical self also includes the other domains of bodily self-recognition, the sense of body ownership, and that of action self-agency. The processing of the physical self primarily involves sensory and motor association cortices located in the right hemisphere (Fig. 4a) . Specifically, the involved sensory association cortices are related to the sensory modalities relevant to the stimulus or representation: vision (i.e., ventral and dorsal pathways), somatic sensation, and sometimes interoception (i.e., insula) in the case of the visual self-face recognition. The motor association cortices include, laterally, premotor areas (i.e., both dorsal and ventral) and, medially, supplementary and cingulate motor areas.
The second category, the interpersonal self, is assumed to represent the attention or intentions of others directed at the self, exemplified by the process activated during the perception of the self-directed eye-gaze of others. This category of self is considered to be supported by several amodal association cortices in the dorsomedial frontal and lateral posterior cortices (Fig. 4b) , which overlap with the cortical network involved with the inference of the mental state of others (i.e., theory of mind or mentalizing) (Senju and Johnson, 2009 ). The third category, the social self, has been postulated to be a collection of context-dependent social-values. As shown in neuroimaging studies related to self-reflection (Craik et al., 1999; Kelley et al., 2002) , the social self seems to be supported by the ventral aspect of the medial prefrontal cortex and the posterior cingulate cortex (Fig. 4c) , areas also known to process value-based decision making (Rangel et al., 2008; Rushworth et al., 2011) and episodic memory retrieval (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006; Wagner et al., 2005) , respectively. This model adopts the explanation of the self as a phenomenal aspect of contingency detection, which is a rather classical notion (David et al., 2008; Sato and Yasuda, 2005; Wegner and Wheatley, 1999) and has been formalized within the framework of the forward-model (Frith et al., 2000) . In the case of self-face recognition in the mirror, forward prediction is a key process for detecting temporal contingency between one's facial or head movement and the visually perceived motion of the image in the mirror. We implicitly predict how the image moves using the internal sensorimotor schema, which is the association between one's motor output (motor plan) and the consequential perceptual input (sensory feedback), learned through repeated experiences. The discrepancy between the prediction and the actual input (i.e., prediction error) induces the sense of 'otherness' and triggers neural processing for the perceptual or contextual scrutiny for the cause of the discrepancy. Activation of the sensory or motor association cortex relevant to the physical self is explained in terms of this scrutiny, owing to prediction error or task-induced top-down attention to the internal (sensorimotor) schema.
The model assumes that our interpersonal and social selves also share these forward-model computational characteristics, despite differences in the underlying cognitive processes and neural substrates. The interpersonal self is the phenomenal aspect of the functioning of an interpersonal schema that represents an association between one's social action and the expected responses of others. The social self is relevant to the social-value schema that represents a link between one's social behavior and the predicted evaluation of this behavior.
Furthermore, these three categories of self, or internal schemata, are assumed to comprise a hierarchical layered structure in the order of the physical, interpersonal, and social selves. The maturation of one layer, or schema, serves as the basis for the development of the next layer (Fig. 4) .
Self-face recognition in the three-layer framework
This forward-model account of self-cognition in the three-layer framework seems to provide an explanation for classical selfface-specific activation that is an alternative to the unique-system notion. It also explains self-face-specific deactivation and contextdependent self-face-specific activation.
Physical aspects
According to the forward-model account, activation of the sensory and motor association cortices during self-face recognition may reflect cognitive scrutiny due to prediction error or taskinduced top-down attention to the internal schema. Careful review of the relevant studies provides further insight. The studies that reported prominent self-face-specific activation typically used face stimuli in non-canonical views, such as from non-frontal views (Oikawa et al., 2012; Sugiura et al., 2005 Sugiura et al., , 2006 Sugiura et al., , 2008 , with expression (Morita et al., 2008; Sugiura et al., 2006 Sugiura et al., , 2008 , in motion (Sugiura et al., 2006 (Sugiura et al., , 2014 , and of childhood (Apps et al., 2012) . Activation has been implicated in the process of updating the selfface representation based on synchronized visual and tactile inputs in front of the mirror (Apps et al., 2013) . When looking at our own face in the mirror, we usually spend a vast majority of time observing its frontal view, without expression or motion. It is likely that the visual representation of our own face in the long-term memory is in this canonical view, and the recognition in other views may require cognitive scrutiny to transform the non-canonical view to a canonical view.
In addition, activation in different sensory association cortices may reflect transformation of different aspects of non-canonicity. A recent study on mirrored self-face recognition compared activation between static and dynamic presentations (Sugiura et al., 2014) . Activation for the static self-face was observed in the right inferior temporal, supramarginal and inferior frontal gyri; these regions may be relevant to the transformation of static features of the self-face required to compensate for the atypical presentation of the face caused by the experimental settings. When the self-face was presented with mouth motion, however, activation of several other regions, including the bilateral superior parietal lobules and the intraparietal sulci was also observed. This is suggestive of roles for these regions in the cognitive processing of dynamic features, which are rarely included in the representation of the self-face. Consistent with this segregation, patients with lesions in the latter regions have been reported to show impairments in self-recognition of a body part, but not a face part (Frassinetti et al., 2012) ; it is likely that the representation of the self-body is more relevant to dynamic features than to static features.
Interpersonal aspects
Self-face-specific deactivation may reflect a facet of self-face recognition that belongs to the interpersonal layer of the threelayer framework. The significance of self-face-specific deactivation in self-face recognition may be conceived based on the observation that self-face recognition emerges following the suppression of other directed responses to a mirror image. The deactivated regions, such as the bilateral temporo-parietal junction, anterior temporal cortex, and medial prefrontal cortex (Devue et al., 2007; Morita et al., 2008; Sugiura et al., 2005 Sugiura et al., , 2008 Uddin et al., 2005) , overlap with regions implicated in the perception of the selfdirected eye-gaze of others (Senju and Johnson, 2009) , as well as in the inference of the mental state of others (Frith and Frith, 2006; Gallagher and Frith, 2003) . The model assumes that these regions underpin the interpersonal self or the learned association between one's social actions (i.e., output) and the social response of others (i.e., consequential perceptual input) (Sugiura, 2013) . Processing the attention or intentions of others directed at the self is critical when confronted with any face other than the self-face. For the selfface, the recruitment of such social processes may be inefficient, given the limited computational resources of the brain. Considering the fact that the face-recognition system recruits social processes automatically, this deactivation is likely to reflect the functioning of top-down suppression as an adoptive energy-saving mechanism.
It is attractive to assume that this neural suppression underlies the behavioral change of the animals in front of the mirror at the emergence of mirrored-self recognition. This consideration leads our interest to the controller of this suppressive process. While speculative, a likely candidate is the right lateral prefrontal cortex. This region has been reported to show increased activation for self-face relative to other faces, and it is involved in cognitive control, including selection and suppression of cognitive processes (Sakai and Passingham, 2003; Sugiura et al., 2007) . In an account of the mirror sign (Coltheart, 2010) , failure in the correction of the false belief of "not me" generated in a perceptual route was attributed to the dysfunction of this region. The role of the prefrontal cortex in self-face recognition, however, is largely a future issue. A recent neuroimaging study on mirrored-self recognition demonstrated functional segregation of the right prefrontal cortex: some regions commonly are responsive to different self-relevant cues (i.e., perceptual routes), while other regions are responsive to conflict between those cues (Sugiura et al., 2014) .
Social aspects
Context-induced self-face-specific activation observed previously in the ventromedial prefrontal and posterior cingulate cortices appears relevant to processes in the social-value layer in the three-layer framework. Such activation, elicited when distractors included a large proportion of unfamiliar faces , may be explained by enhancement of the socialvalue processing of the self-face, owing to the existence of a large amount of references (i.e., distractor faces), as suggested by the social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) . Self-specific activation observed in the posterior cingulate cortex when the self-face appeared attractive (Oikawa et al., 2012) can be explained in a similar manner. Activation of the reward system in the latter study appears to reflect an incentive value related to the attractiveness of the self-face.
These findings thus suggest that the awareness of oneself as a social object or the awareness of social value depends on the context in which one sees the self-face. The existence of social references may trigger cognitive processing of the internal schema of social value of the self, and the reward system may also be recruited, reflecting the motivational value of the situation (i.e., the self-face in the context).
Context-dependent modulation of self-face-induced activation does not always occur in the social-value layer; such a modulation appears to be associated only with the context in which references relevant to the social value of the self exist. Other contexts may modulate activation during self-face recognition in different layers. Under the context in which the self-face was presented in nonphotogenic pictures and the face-viewing task was observed by another person (Morita et al., 2014) , activation was enhanced in the right anterior insula (interoceptive association cortex) and caudal anterior cingulate cortex (arguably, a motor-associated component of the cingulate cortex), that is, in the sensorimotor layer.
Individual differences in activation during self-face recognition
Potential for a multi-dimensional diagnostic tool
Given the multi-faceted nature of self-face-specific activation and the self-non-specific primary roles of the involved mechanisms reviewed thus far, it appears reasonable to expect individual differences in self-face-specific activation to reflect the individual characteristics of a wide range of self-non-specific cognitive domains. In the three-layer framework, activation of the neural substrates for the physical, interpersonal, and social schemata may reflect the individual characteristics of the perceptual, supervisory, and motivational processes, respectively. Neural characteristics of the perceptual and integration systems, particularly those related to the processing of prediction error, may be associated with the individual characteristics related to understanding common environmental situations in daily life, in addition to recognition of the self-face. Individual differences in the functioning of the supervisory inhibitory mechanism regulating inappropriate or unnecessary social-cognitive processes (i.e., suppression of the interpersonal schema) may exist also during daily social or non-social situations other than self-face recognition. Individual variance of the processing of social values and responsiveness of the reward or motivational system affects not only neural activity during self-face recognition but also self-awareness, self-evaluation, and social behavior in a daily social context. Therefore, individual differences in activation during self-face recognition may be used as a multi-dimensional diagnostic tool for the characteristics of an individual's cognitive system, including personality traits and mental disorders. It has been demonstrated previously that at least three components of cross-subject variation were included in activation during self-face recognition, and each component was related to different types of self-stimulus and was associated with a different cortical region (Sugiura et al., 2006) .
Existing findings
Neuroimaging research on individual differences in activation during self-face recognition is in its infancy. Explored system characteristics are thus far limited to a few dimensions related to self-awareness, self-evaluation, and social behavior.
For normal subjects, two personality traits have been addressed using a region-of-interest approach and a liberal statistical threshold. A high public self-consciousness score is associated with activation during self-face recognition in the right inferior frontal regions, with the examined loci differing between two studies (Kita et al., 2011; Morita et al., 2008) . In one study, high self-esteem has been associated with activation during the recognition of an attractive self-face in the posterior cingulate cortex and that of an unattractive self-face in the ventral tegmental area (Oikawa et al., 2012) .
The effects of some relevant mental disorders have also been investigated, but the findings are sporadic. Three studies have addressed autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and reported findings inconsistent among one another; an early study reported abnormal activation during the recognition of unfamiliar faces, compared with the self-face , and recent studies reported decreased activation in the right inferior frontal region in autistic children (Kita et al., 2011) or in the posterior cingulate cortex in autistic adults (Morita et al., 2012) . Two studies used self-image as a means to induce anxiety in patients with social anxiety disorder (Pujol et al., 2013) or body dysmorphic disorder (Bohon et al., 2012) and were able to detect anxiety-related activation. One study featured a small number of schizophrenic patients and reported an abnormality in connectivity across several brain regions, while failing to detect it in a conventional subtraction analysis (Yun et al., 2014) .
Future research perspectives
In order to develop this line of research in the context of a multidimensional diagnostic tool for the individual cognitive system, I consider the following three directions particularly promising from the perspective of the three-layer model.
First, for individual differences in social self-awareness, selfevaluation, or behavior, research should not focus on the classical self-face-responsive areas. Such characteristics are unlikely to be attributed to the physical self in the sensory-motor layer. Instead, the areas implicated in social-context-dependent activation appear promising, given their relevance to the social-value layer. In fact, the relationship between self-esteem and attractivenessdependent activation for the self-face in the posterior cingulate cortex and ventral tegmental area (Oikawa et al., 2012) , as well as that between the ASD and lower activation of the posterior cingulate cortex (Morita et al., 2012) , are congruent with this prediction.
Second, in this vein, individual differences in the degree of self-face specific deactivation (i.e., interpersonal layer) are also interesting. This divergence may be related to social characteristics that convey both adaptive and non-adaptive nuances; for example, a lower degree of deactivation may reflect the immaturity in forming self-other distinctions, or the tendency to monitor the social appearance of the self-face objectively.
Finally, individual differences in activation of the classical selfface-responsive areas are likely to be associated with cognitive processing of prediction error. Here the characteristics may be relevant to the prediction error related to the self-face, to other self-related perceptions, or to self-nonspecific environmental input. A low degree of neural response to the non-canonicity of the presented self-face may parallel the efficacy in suppressing or ignoring the prediction error that is irrelevant to the task or context. Such behavioral characteristics appear adaptive in most of the daily scenes.
Conclusion
Classical brain mapping studies of self-face recognition have sought primarily to identify a unique neural system underlying the concept of 'self', as an engram of human-like intelligence. The findings are, however, inconsistent with this notion; activation characteristics for the self-face have multiple aspects, and the involved neural mechanisms are not self-specific. The findings seem to be explained comprehensively by a forward-model account of the three categories of self: the physical self, interpersonal self, and social self. The model explains the self as a phenomenal aspect of the functioning of the internal schema, the learned association between one's behavioral output and the consequential perceptual input.
The sensory and motor association cortices activated during self-face recognition seem to be the sensorimotor schema, which is the association between one's motor output and the consequential perceptual input. The observed activation of the schema may reflect cognitive scrutiny caused by prediction error or task-induced topdown attention. Activation in different sensory association cortices may reflect transformation of the different aspects of sensory input to match the canonical representation. Several amodal association cortices in the dorsomedial frontal and lateral posterior cortices are deactivated specifically during the recognition of the self-face. These regions may correspond to the interpersonal schema, the association between one's social action and the expected responses of others. Deactivation may reflect adaptive suppression of the default recruitment of the social-response system during face recognition. The ventral aspects of the medial prefrontal cortex and the posterior cingulate cortex were specifically activated for the self-face only in the context where references relevant to the selfface existed. These areas may represent the social value schema, which is the link between one's social behavior and the predicted evaluation of this behavior. The existence of a social reference may trigger cognitive processing of the internal schema of social value of the self.
Given the multi-faceted nature of self-face-specific activation and the self-non-specific roles of the involved mechanisms, individual differences in self-face-specific activation may reflect the individual characteristics of a wide range of cognitive domains. Such data may be used as a multi-dimensional diagnostic tool for the characteristics of an individual's cognitive system, including personality traits and mental disorders. Neuroimaging research in this line has just begun; explored system characteristics are limited thus far to a few dimensions related to self-awareness, self-evaluation, and social behavior. Future research should focus on the search for individual characteristics outside of the classical self-face-responsive areas. Self-face specific deactivation is likely to be an interesting area of research. Finally, classical self-faceresponsive areas are likely to be associated with the areas of the cognitive system responsible for the processing of prediction error.
